In 2001 South Africa introduced a social policy to provide all citizens, but particularly the poor, with a monthly supply of limited volumes of free water. Although criticised by international agencies at the time, lifeline tariffs to the poor are now promoted as a strategy to meet the Millennium Development Goals. Much of free basic water's contemporary allure lies in its ostensible artifice in offering water security to poor citizens whilst simultaneously strengthening the municipal cost-recovery regime. Past attempts at unravelling what has become something of a social policy allegory were hindered by the absence of a state voice in this intriguing narrative. A legal challenge launched by poor Soweto, Johannesburg citizens has enabled the public to have access to state affidavits. These primary data, together with improved positioning of free water literature within a broader scope of municipal water systems (rights, volumes and tariff structures), socio-political paradigms and a more rigorous interrogation of previously uncontested international standards and ideological 'neutral' discourses provide a more comprehensive chronicle of the complex free water narratives. As such, the offering of free water, far from being a benign concession, was used to contain very poor households to limited volumes of water beneath what they required whilst ensuring that the majority of still poor households, who consumed beyond the free volumes, paid the full cost of the water service.
Introduction
In 2001 South Africa introduced a social policy to provide all citizens, but particularly the poor, with a monthly supply of limited volumes of free water (6 kl per household per month). The policy was initiated by national government to promote equity, to meet the constitutional right of South Africans to water and as a developmental concession in the context of post-apartheid redress. Yet, much of free basic water's contemporary allure lies in its ostensible artifice in offering basic water security to poor citizens whilst simultaneously strengthening the municipal cost-recovery regime. This latter expression is the motif for this article, which considers the broader intentions of the state in granting free basic services, and interrogates the timing, form and design of such concessions.
Previous attempts to thread together a comprehensive account of the free basic water story were clouded by popular imagination, varied interpretations, contestations and conjecture, factors attributable to the absence of state voice prior to 2007. Subsequently, a legal challenge Mazibuko and Others vs City of Johannesburg 1 was launched, whereby poor citizens in Phiri, Soweto contested prepaid water meters and free basic water volumes, thereby enabling public access to state affidavits, which afforded greater transparency, as opposed to mere political rhetoric, to the debates. This article however is not an attempt at closure nor does it claim to be an authoritative history. Primary data, together with an improved positioning of free basic water literature within a broader scope of water delivery systems (rights, volumes and tariff structures), national and international socio-political paradigms and a more rigorous interrogation of previously uncontested international standards and ideological 'neutral' discourses, may simply provide a more comprehensive chronicle of the complex free basic water narratives. I will show how free basic water became detached from the initial social good concept of securing access to an affordable water supply for poor citizens and reattached to strengthening local cost recovery and demand management. The value of this article's exploration is salient because the engagements, decisions, intentions and contestations concerning the conceptualisation and design of free basic water policy are now playing themselves out, with major ramifications for poor households at an infinitesimal level.
The scope of this article is limited to policy processes, occurrences and interventions leading up to the adoption and conceptualisation of South Africa's free basic water policy. It does not address the various interpretations of free basic water by municipalities, implementation and service delivery frameworks, nor the experiences of poor households of free basic water. Data for this article are derived from numerous water and welfare-related literature and primary sources.
Economic and service delivery context
The apartheid policy of separate development ensured that services were delivered along racial lines, with black South Africans receiving inferior and inequitable services, or no services at all (Cottle, 2004) . This resulted in a dual water service delivery challenge: to reduce the apartheid backlog 2 whilst concurrently raising the level of service delivered (Hemson, 2004) .
Before 2001, all water actually consumed had to be paid for, since the new government only committed itself initially to the objective of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) to provide access (i.e. infrastructure) (African National Congress (ANC, 1994) ; Department of Water 1 For more information about the legal challenge, including access to all affidavits and other legal documents, see the Centre for Applied Legal Studies' (University of Witwatersrand) website: http://web.wits.ac.za/Academic/Centres/CALS/BasicServices/ PhiriWaterRights.htm and the Anti-Privatisation Forum's Coalition Against Water Privatisation, accessed at http://apf.org.za/ spip.php?rubrique41. Please note that legal judgments are beyond the scope of this article. 2 The extent of the backlogs is contested and the figures range from 10.6 million at the RDP standard of a tap within 200 m of homesteads (Hemson, 2004: 10-11) , 'down to just more than four million people', as reported by Mike Muller, the Director General of the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (Muller, 2004: 32-33) . Government statistics are frequently contested. This is not the place to debate the accuracy of such figures, suffice to indicate that water service delivery and beating the backlog presents a significant challenge.
, but the primary target of the policy was poor households for whom free basic services represented a significant poverty alleviation measure; poor households would benefit the most from an affordable basic water supply (ANC, 2000; DWAF, 2002a) . The extension of free basic water to poor households based on the principles of improving public health, gender and equity was recognised by government as a significant poverty alleviation mechanism (Mbeki: President's speech, 2001; DWAF, 2002a) . The free basic water policy of 2001 was announced in the local government election manifesto (September 2000) . It was to be implemented in July 2001 , progressively until June 2003 (DWAF, 2001 . The free basic amount approved by Cabinet was 6,000 l/6 kilolitres (6 kl) of potable water per household per month. Disaggregated, 6,000 l per household per month provides 200 l per household per day, or 25 l per member of an eight-member household per day (Kasrils, 2001b) . If households consumed more than 6 kl per month, they would be expected to pay for the additional water consumed at the standard tariff rate (DWAF, 2001 ).
South African socio-political milieu
Despite some initial trepidation, free basic services were seen as a major step towards overcoming apartheid inequities and developing meaningful social citizenship (Veotte, 2001; Bond, 2002a; McDonald, 2002a; Greeff, 2003) . With free basic services and expanding welfare (the child support grant, health and education-related initiatives), the ANC was seen to be recommitting to its freedom promises borne out of the Freedom Charter, the RDP and South Africa's Constitution. Those close to government (Muller, 2008) and scholars (Hemson, 2000; Mosdell, 2006) alike expressed that the shift was a major departure from past water policies, which prioritised water as an 'economic good' and, indeed, the preceding ANC policies themselves.
Some of this praise, however, was linked to the timing of the intervention: Kasrils (former Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry) and his department had undertaken their quest to provide South African citizens with free water in a milieu which was wary of interventions that might re-prioritise the public and 'social good' qualities of water (Muller, 2008) . International finance institutions were afraid of the precedent it would set for financing water access, specifically the implications for cost recovery (see Bond, 2002a: 242, 254) . In this regard, when criticisms started to emerge (see later) some civil society organisations initially defended Kasrils and felt that the sudden jump to questioning government intentionality was unfair (Greeff, 2003) .
We now consider various interpretations that have been offered for the ANC's shift from full cost recovery to a more concessionary services regime. Those on the left suggested that the ANC was responding to the largest cholera epidemic in at least a quarter of a century, which infected 120,000 people and claimed 265 lives, in August 2000. It was caused by the introduction in 1998/99 of prepaid water meters into formerly free communal standpipes; poor people, unable to pay, were forced to drink from polluted rivers (Hemson, 2000; Cottle & Deedat, 2002) . The consequences of the epidemic coincided with the 'Water for All' campaign for 50 l free water per person per day and the fight for other basic services by ordinary citizens, which spawned a variety of concerned residents' movements (Veotte, 2001; Rural Development Services Network (RDSN), 2000) . The epidemic, together with the campaign for water rights and community protests, forced a compromise. In this, the left claimed a class struggle victory forced out of national government through popular struggle 5 (Veotte, 2001; Cottle, 2004) .
Kasrils claimed that the concession was based on seeing a woman collect water at a riverbed in Lutsheko, Eastern Cape (Kasrils, 2001a) , thereby signalling a return to heroic nationalism (Kasrils, 2003) , the extension of the 'South African miracle' and recognition that despite progress in infrastructure implementation, affordability constraints still proved a barrier to access (Kasrils, 2001a) . With the looming December 2000 municipal elections and citizen impatience and resistance growing, the ANC saw water as a key part of their electoral campaign. It announced that the ANC-led local government 'will provide all residents with a free basic amount of water, electricity and other municipal services, so as to help the poor' (ANC, 2000) . Government has denied that the timing of the introduction of free basic water was related to election gains (Kasrils: media statement, 2000a) ; however, it admitted that the policy process was accelerated to coincide with them (Muller, 2008) .
Bureaucrats closer to the machinery of implementation interpreted the shift as a pragmatic recognition of the failure of full cost recovery and of punitive disconnections which resulted in increased civil militancy and threats to the security of the water infrastructure itself, since many residents were illegally reconnecting to the water network: hence the realisation that it might be better just to give poor people some free water. This school of pragmatic thought was linked to a growing recognition of the apparent success of the 'Durban case', the forerunner of free basic water, which found that access to a limited volume of water could be given free whilst simultaneously making good economic sense (Sussens & Vermeulen, 2001; Bailey, 2003; Macleod, 2007) and engendering the good faith of the populace. Grounded in such a philosophy, free basic services were a type of administrative logic and strategy; in the words of then Director-General Muller:
… the free basic water strategy is an innovative approach that will enable us to separate the can't pays from the won't pays. Only the really proven poor should get these (free services) while anyone else should be forced to pay even at higher tariffs (Muller, 2001: 1) .
In time, however, stronger criticisms surfaced from all sides of the ideological spectrum: on the right, conservatives and liberals expressed alarm at the idea of free services. They argued that it would undermine fragile cost recovery gains, decrease financial sustainability, limit individual economic 'choices', increase environmental scarcity, overburden the state and erode market confidence (Still, 2001; Bate & Tren, 2002; Rogers et al., 2002; Savenije & van der Zaag, 2002; Whittington, 2003; Bernstein, 2005) . Government documents and statements, however, assured that free basic water was consistent with cost recovery. Municipal bureaucrats who contended that messages of free basic water would be construed by consumers as providing free rein to stop paying for all water volumes used were assured that this was not so. For example: DWAF (2001: 10) reassured local government that 'cost recovery remains a key objective of local government and that consumers will have to pay for services above the basic level'.
Indeed, such pronouncements, I will argue, reflected a broader plan, which was that the introduction of free basic water would not only not deviate from the 'user pays' principle but could actually strengthen it (DWAF, 2001 (DWAF, , 2003 :
… the free basic water policy strengthens the ('user pays') principle in that it clearly requires consumption in excess of the basic water supply service to be paid for while enabling free access by the poor to a basic water supply service necessary to sustain life (DWAF, 2003: 29, their 
emphasis).
Trade unions and the 'left' drew on well-rehearsed anti-neoliberal critiques to criticise free basic services and noted their continuity with cost recovery, but could not demonstrate this adequately. Fixated with quantitative delivery statistics, left critics questioned the timing of concessions, inadequacy of free service volumes offered (to meet, for example, the water requirements of large households and increased water requirements of persons living with HIV/AIDS) and modes of delivery, access-linked concessions, geographic biases and continuing household affordability constraints (Hemson, 2000; Bond, 2002a, b; McDonald, 2002a; Cosatu & Samwu, 2003; Harvey, 2003; McDonald & Ruiters, 2005; Smith & Green, 2005) . It became clear, the left argued, that free basic water had become detached from the spirit in which it was ostensibly conceived and instead reattached to 'help', which according to Gronemeyer's (1993) critique is more commonly situated within the economics of a calculated costbenefit analysis. Taken further, leftist scholars (McDonald, 2002c; Pape, 2002; Loftus, 2005) argued that offering free basic services shielded proponents of commercialisation from many accusations of inhumanity and profiting from the very poor whilst allowing capital to strengthen its march on the less poor because the economic fundamentals remained unchanged.
South African water rights and legal framework
Most scholars and commentators on water start by emphasising the right to water (Khosa, 2000; McDonald & Pape, 2002; Ruiters & Stein, 2002; Bond, 2004) . The RDP of 1994 is cited as the first major statement of intent by the state to redress South Africa's skewed water resource and service legacy. It recognised the right of all South Africans to access clean water and adequate sanitation for the attainment of household water security (ANC, 1994) . The RDP saw water as a means to promote health and hygiene. Water service access was to be achieved through the establishment of a national water and sanitation programme which, as its short-term aim would provide all households with 20-30 l of clean and safe water per capita per day within 200 m of dwellings, increasing to 50 l in the medium term (ANC, 1994) . Water supplied should be affordable through the mechanisms of lifeline tariffs, progressive block tariffs (increasing block tariffs (IBT)) and cross-subsidisation (ANC, 1994) . These writers also stress the White Paper on Water Supply and Sanitation (1994), which gave effect to only the RDP's short-term objective, as a minimum standard for a basic water supply (Schreiner, 2007: 35) . The South African Constitution of 1996 guaranteed the right to access water which was to be realised progressively (RSA, 1996b) . Commensurate with this, legislative obligations in the Water Services Act of 1997 elaborated an implementation framework to ensure that 'Everyone has a right of access to basic water supply and basic sanitation' (RSA, 1997: 12) . The 'sufficient' volume of water referred to in the Bill of Rights (RSA, 1996b: s27.1(b)) was reworded as 'basic' and defined as the 'prescribed minimum standard of water supply services necessary for the reliable supply of a sufficient quantity and quality of water to households to support life and personal hygiene' (RSA, 1997: 8). There are major debates about the minimum standards of services to meet 'basic' needs. Definitions of the volume of water required, to meet 'basic' needs, then become politically important. For much of the scholarship on service delivery these legal foundations framed their subsequent critiques. Non-governmental organisations and civil society broadly reflected this thinking (for example: South African Water Caucus and Southern African Regional Poverty Network).
This volume was not yet conceived as a free volume but as a basic supply (Schreiner, 2007: 36) . The minimum standard for basic water supply services, as provided by regulations under section 9 (1) of the Water Services Act is: (1) 'the provision of appropriate education in respect of effective water use' and (2) 'a minimum quantity of potable water of 25 l per capita per day or 6 kl per household per month, within 200 m of a household' (DWAF, 2002c: 26, my emphasis) . The White Paper on Water Supply and Sanitation (1994) was replaced by the Strategic Framework for Water Services (2003) and, like the Free Basic Water Policy (2001) before it, retained the minimum of 25 l per capita per day as promulgated in the Water Services Act (DWAF, 2002c) . From the start, therefore, water provision went beyond simple provision to include elements of state 'guidance' over the behaviour and attitudes of needy residents (see the international social control literatures of Gronemeyer, 1993; Brown, 2006; Rose, 2006) .
The South African state insisted that 'water and sanitation services should be delivered equitably, affordably, effectively, efficiently, sustainably and gender sensitively to satisfy sector goals' (DWAF, 2003: 9, my emphasis). The theme of environmental scarcity and sustainability pervades much of the literature on domestic water services. For example, government and environmental organisations alike stress that South Africa is a water-stressed country, rainfall is well below the global average and rainfall is unevenly distributed (see DWAF, 2003; Environmental Monitoring Group, 2005; Intergovernmental Fiscal Review, 2008; Muller, 2008) . Scholars (Turton, 1998; Bond et al., 2000) note, however, that environmental and government commentators make much of scarcity; very little is made of water resource allocation. For example, the Intergovernmental Fiscal Review (2008: 92) , citing DWAF, accounts the total use of water by sector (2006/7) as the following: 61% for agriculture/irrigation/livestock watering, 32% domestic/ industrial (municipal), 6% forestry and 1% unbillable. Such statistics belie the racial and domestic slant of allocation. For example, water resource allocation is still drawn predominately along the inequitable lines of race, land and economic ownership or access (Bond, 2002b; Cottle, 2004) . Domestic consumption accounts for 12%, of which half is used for swimming pools and gardens in wealthy and largely white residential homes. Less than one-tenth of this domestic amount is consumed by all black South African households Motala &Tilley, 2000; Bond, 2002b) .
The White Paper on a National Water Policy for South Africa (DWAF, 1997: 4) states, 'only that water required to meet basic human needs and maintain environmental sustainability will be guaranteed as a right. This will be known as the Reserve.' In this sense, of course, we are talking about the right to water and not 'free' water (as per RSA, 1997) . It is argued by Calland (2002) (writing in The Cape Times, day unknown) that, in the case of free basic water, the 'reserve' or 'minimum core right' represents the entirety of the right itself. Indeed, Walker (1993: 41) warned of the dangers of conflating minimum standards of services to meet 'basic' needs with the absolute level necessary to sustain life. In the realm of a 'rights-based' framing of 'basic' needs definitions then became even more significant and indeed point to the limits of rights.
More critical legal scholars stress that water rights are directly related to civil society's ability to pressure the state to deliver. That is, by the ability to defend socio-economic rights in law (Flynn & Chirwa, 2005; Bond & Dugard, 2008) . Moreover, other legal writers (De Waal et al., 2001 ) stress the differences between positive and negative rights (civil and political or 'first-generation' rights). Negative rights impose a duty on the state 'not to act in certain ways', that is to protect society from any 'deliberately retrogressive measure', which would deny citizens their existing access to a social service (De Waal et al., 2001: 432-435) .
Conceptualisation of free basic water
Within government, there is some contestation on the origins of free basic water. Common to both literatures however, is that of trying to supply water to citizens with previously tenuous access. The first, 'the Durban case', sought to provide a basic supply of water to recently urbanised residents living in informal settlements; the second recognised that poor rural citizens could not afford to pay the 'user fees' which accompanied newly implemented water infrastructures.
Macleod (Durban's water manager) has argued that free basic water was invented in Durban by his Water Service Department. Prior to 1997, the Durban Metropolitan Council, under his leadership, was tasked with investigating the water access options of citizens residing in the burgeoning informal settlements springing up around Durban (Macleod, 2007: 3) . Macleod noted that the chief means of water access for these citizens was via the purchase of water at local trading stores:
… at great cost. This manner of obtaining water was unsustainable and created significant social and financial problems in the area. This lead to destruction of water infrastructure and fire hydrants as illegal methods of connection were sought (Macleod, 2007: 4) . This, according to Macleod (2007: 4) resulted in the decision to 'undertake informal research in these "informal settlement" areas'. The 'research' involved:
… meeting with the members of the community (primarily the women who had the responsibility for finding and carrying water for the home) and trying to establish how much water they used per day. It was established that approximately 7 l of water was used per person per day as this was generally the amount that an individual could physically carry and could afford (Macleod, 2007: 4) Thereafter, community members were shown a number of different sized drums and asked to select the drum 'which would give sufficient water' (Macleod, 2007: 4) . The 'discussions with the developing communities' culminated in the introduction, by the Durban Metropolitan Council, of the provision of 200 l per site per day instituted via the daily filling of a 200-l household water drum at a minimal charge (Macleod, 2007: 4) .
During 1998, the eThekwini Municipal Council assessed the bailiff-operated system implemented in Durban's informal settlements, as part of a strategy considering ways to ensure that poor households had permanent access to a water supply, and found that 'the amount of money that was collected by the Council for the water supply was in fact equivalent to or less than the costs of administering the collection of the amounts from the relevant communities' (Macleod, 2007: 4) . The outcome was the decision to implement the drum water supply system, providing 200 l per day or 6 kl per month, at zero charge (Bailey, 2003; Macleod, 2007) . It is no wonder then that Macleod (2007: 3) declared that during 1997 and 1998, 'eThekwini Municipality was instrumental in introducing free basic water to South Africa and in coming up with a measure for the amount of water that should be given free to indigent communities'. The former Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry conceptualised water access in the same vein, putting the stress on those without formal access as well as problems of affordability once infrastructure is provided.
At a dried out river bed in the remote Eastern Cape village of Lutsheko, I came across a young woman with a 3-week-old baby on her back. She was on her knees scooping muddy water out of a shallow hole to fill her container. I asked why she did not use the village water scheme. The scheme provides each family with 6,000 l of fresh water a month for only R10. She told me she could not afford it (Kasrils, 2000b ; his article in The Cape Times, 19 July 2000).
Mike Muller, who was the Director General of the Department of Water Affairs during the period when 'the Free Basic Water (DWAF) policy was conceptualised and implemented' (Muller, 2006: 2), holds the same view of previous in-access:
… it gradually became obvious that there were problems of access, as many people were too poor to take advantage of the new services. Thus, a new policy determined that all South Africans should receive a basic water supply free of charge (Muller, 2008: 67) .
In 2000, as the ANC discussed the provision of free basic water, the eThekwini Municipality experience became instructive:
In my view the experiences in eThekwini Municipality influenced government policy when it came in 2000 to determine the amount of free water that should be provided by all municipalities. I was involved in that decision and I personally engaged with Minister Ronnie Kasrils, the then Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry, during this time (Macleod, 2007: 5) .
Kasrils and others close to government (Sussens & Vermeulen, 2001 ) have affirmed the influence of the Durban case on the conceptualisation of the free basic water policy on numerous occasions. For example:
The City of Durban has demonstrated the possibility of providing free water to the poor by providing the first 6,000 litres per month free. Thereafter, the more customers use on a rising tariff scale, the more they pay. Revenue from ratepayers consuming greater amounts of water helps to cross-subsidise the poor. Whether you are rich or poor, if consumption is under 6,000 litres, you are not billed. A total of 93% of bills are paid, which shows that non-payment is often a problem of affordability and that a system can work without the insistence on cost recovery from all consumers … The challenge is to find ways of funding the rural areas where the cost-cutting advantages of the cities and towns don't exist. If the Durban model can be replicated in all urban centres, then the Government can concentrate on providing water service grants for rural councils (Kasrils, 2000b ; writing in The Cape Times, 19 July 2000, my emphasis).
However, in 2007, with the Mazibuko and Others vs City of Johannesburg ruling, it appeared that DWAF was trying to distance itself from the Durban case:
The Durban example contributed to the policy on free basic water but was not the only factor relied upon in finalising the policy. It is incorrect that then Minister Kasrils based the free basic water policy solely on the Durban case (Schreiner, 2007: 73, my emphasis) .
The rationale to downplay the decisive role of Durban in the free basic water story emerged in response to escalating contestations of the Durban model (see Patrick Bond's 2007 affidavit indicating, among others, the bureaucratic trickiness underpinning the Durban free basic water offering which acted to sabotage free basic water by sharply increasing the price of the subsequent block (Bond, 2007) ). Hence, the universal application of a problematic model as well as questions concerning its conception would undermine the entire project. Nevertheless, although legally necessary -the argument was weak -this was not a dilemma of causality. Moreover, Bond's (2007) aspersions about the craftiness underpinning free basic water are, in the next section, given even more credibility owing to the strange rationale underlying the final volume of free basic water offered.
The water volume debates: how much is enough?
Once free basic water was declared a new imperative for local government the debate about exactly how much was enough and why 6 kl was chosen opened up. The offering of 6 kl was criticised by the left for not being enough (see, for example: McDonald, 2002c; Harvey, 2003; Smith, 2003; Bond, 2004; Deedat, 2006) . Moreover, some argued the volumes offered had more to do with what was convenient for the state's cost recovery goals (Desai, 2001; Pape, 2002; McDonald, 2002a; Bond, 2004; Ruiters, 2005; Smith & Green, 2005) . As a response, two major threads run through the debates on water requirements: the first is the influence of international domestic water quantity 'standards' and the second is the issue of scarcity. The former introduced scientific contestation within international and national discourse; the latter was even more vexed, with international scholars interrogating prevailing 'population-resources' ideological assumptions, which actually turned the notion of needs and scarcity on its head.
Over the years, a number of international agencies posted recommendations for water requirements of between 20 and 40 l per capita per day (Gleick, 1998) . For example, by the United States Agency for International Development, the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees, the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme and the World Health Organisation (WHO). Much of the literature that is available frames basic water requirements in rights-based or physiological and biological terms, that is, the volumes of water to meet absolute/emergency needs: prevent dehydration, cook a basic staple meal and ensure basic hygiene (Gleick, 1996 (Gleick, , 1998 . Moreover, very little justification, if any, is provided about how the water requirements were calculated. For example, the United Nations Development Programme, via its Human Development Report (2006: 65) advocated 'every person has a human right to a minimum of about 20 l each day' in terms of 'establishing social minimum provision levels' (my emphasis). No justification is given: '20 l' is simply repeated in various guises 13 times throughout the text. Gleick (1996: 90) himself, with notable omissions, had recommended a basic water requirement as a 'fundamental human right' of 50 l per capita per day, allowing 15 l for bathing, 10 l for cooking, 5 l drinking water and 20 l for sanitation and hygiene.
Consistent with most of the international agencies indicated above, DWAF did not provide explanations for how it had calculated that 25 l was enough to meet 'basic' needs. Instead, the key justification for DWAF's quantification of FBW offered is the WHO's 'standards' of 25 litres per capita per day:
The South African standard on a 'basic' level of water supply sufficient to promote healthy living draws on the World Health Organization standard of 25 litres per person per day. This amounts to about 6,000 litres per household per month for a household of eight people. This volume has been set as the basic target for all households in South Africa and will be regulated as part of the national strategy in terms of Sections 9 and 10 of the Water Services Act of 1997 (DWAF, 2001: 2). This reference to 25 l per capita per day is pervasive in the South African free basic water literature. The original source of the WHO 'standards' however, were shrouded in mystery 6 and caused DWAF great consternation. In this regard around 2003, DWAF distanced itself from the WHO 'standards', stating '… the amount of 25 l of water per person is not based on a World Health Organisation standard, but is a widely accepted and internationally applied norm' (Kasrils, 2003; writing in The Witness, 20 November 2003) . This refutation coincided with a contestation from within the WHO itself. Howard & Bartram (2003) repudiated the claim that the WHO had issued recommendations on domestic water requirement standards: 'Despite common claims of WHO standards relating to water quantity, WHO has not previously published specific guidance on the quantities of water as targets for health protection and promotion' (Howard & Bartram, 2003 : 2, my emphasis). They went further, however, than simply refuting the issuing of standards and suggested that the possible source of the erroneous standards (the Global Water Supply and Sanitation Assessment 2000 Report: WHO and UNICEF, 2000) was itself misunderstood.
The WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme, which produces the Global Assessment of Water Supply and Sanitation data, describes reasonable access as being 'the availability of at least 20 l per person per day from a source within 1 km of the user's dwelling ' (WHO and UNICEF, 2000) .
However, it should be noted that this definition relates primarily to access and should not necessarily be taken as evidence that 20 l per capita per day is a recommended quantity of water for domestic use (Howard & Bartram, 2003: 1) .
The South African response to the appeal implicated a conciliatory admission. In the words of Schreiner (2007: 47) : 'At the time that South Africa's water policy was being established, the relevant 6 DWAF cites that the recommendation comes from the WHO; it does not cite a specific document. international agencies had not taken a formal position on quantitative minimum standards. ' Macleod (2007: 5) was more candid and stated:
At the time we were making our investigations in eThekwini Municipality, there was very little research either in South Africa or internationally on the amounts people actually use and need and the research that we had done in eThekwini Municipality was amongst the only actual research relevant to South Africa and the South African experience … at that time there was little other international research to guide us.
Leaving the broader inflections of this statement for a moment, the South Africans still had to respond to the major findings of the Howard and Bartram study (2003) , which showed a positive correlation between improved service levels and higher volumes consumed. For example, if the 100-1,000 m distance between the user and the off-site water source moves to an on-site source, consumption would increase from 20 l per capita per day to 50 l (Howard & Bartram, 2003: 22) . This finding was problematic for a policy providing limited free volumes at closer proximities and improved levels. So, the entire system within which free basic water operated was actually constructed for the realisation of 'natural' increased consumption not 'unnatural' restriction. DWAF defended its offering and cited a decrease in household size (4.48 in 1996 to 3.8 in 2001), the welfare theory 'of general application' (Schreiner, 2007: 41) , the priority of service connection before augmentation to those already connected and suggested that the WHO had 'come around' to the South African standard (see Muller, 2008: 82) .
In sharp contrast to the 'scientific' and ideologically 'neutral' discourse above, international scholars (Illich, 1993; Harvey, 1977 Harvey, , 1996 on the 'radical' left interrogated the assumptions underlying 'scarcity', 'resources' and 'needs'. In this, they drew on Marxist critiques that 'resources' must be understood as 'relational rather than absolute' (Harvey, 1996 : 226 citing Ollman, 1971 . That is, to declare resources as 'absolute' means that society has no control over them when in fact resources are given value, transformed into utility by society and defined in relation to a particular time (Harvey, 1996) . For example, apartheid-era urban water architecture was constructed on differential racial concepts of need and standards (see Mathewson, 1957) . Core to this thesis is that, consistent with Marxist interpretation, needs are not purely biological, but also socially and culturally constructed (Harvey, 1977; Illich, 1993) . Moreover, Harvey (1977: 236) conceives that scarcity is not inherent in nature but socially and culturally determined. Returning to the relational aspect of resources, Harvey (1977: 236) like Marx, in the context of a society dominated by elites, posits its relationship to the 'mode of production' and notes, 'Scarcity is in fact necessary for the survival of the capitalist mode of production and it has to be carefully managed, otherwise the self-regulating aspect of the price mechanism will break down.' Central to this interpretation is that the prevailing views about the populationresources relationship as neutral, absolute and outside of 'our' control are in fact 'political in origin and have political effects' (Harvey, 1977: 237) .
However, it is not Harvey's voice or even Marx's that imbues the local and international populationresources discourse, but Thomas Malthus's 7 ; there are simply too many people and not enough resources. Under the Malthusian assumption of 'overpopulation', someone or some people must be 7 See Thomas Malthus (1970 Malthus ( , first published 1798 . An Essay on the Principle of Population and a Summary View of the Principle of Population. Penguin Books. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, UK. made redundant (Harvey, 1977) . In the milieu of a society dominated by an elite or other powerful interests, the question of who actually must bear the cost is quite simply 'them' -those people that have less power and 'less relevance for the economy' (Illich, 1993: 95) ; that is 'the non-elite invariably experience some form of political, economic, and social repression' (Harvey, 1977: 237) .
Let us return to the free volume of 6 kl, contrived for the settlement of 'basic needs' or 'basic requirements'. Illich (1993) and Gronemeyer (1993) argue that the concept of 'basic needs' is a derivative of development which sought to split humanity above and below a measurable standard of decency and normality and then to remedy deficiencies. Core to this was that 'basic needs' could be expressed, via technical measurements, in monetary terms, which called in a 'new kind of bureaucracy to establish (scientific) criteria for what was acceptable -and what was not' (Illich, 1993: 92, my emphasis) . 'Needs', divorced from diverse social, cultural and place/time contexts, are redetermined 'scientifically' by 'experts' (Rose, 2006: 155) , for the needy. The framing of basic water requirements appears consistent with such an approach. In this regard, Taylor-Gooby (2000: 11) offers a caveat: 'The intellectual dominance of market ideas -one of the few areas in which an approach whose rationale is based on professional expertise goes relatively unchallenged -may lead to policies which are damaging to human interests in tackling the uncertainties that citizens face.'
Water tariff designs and the first free block
The final determination of the free basic volume offered to citizens is typically divorced from an analysis of tariff design setting. Yet pricing policies were to be instrumental in the delivery of free basic water. In the words of Muller (2008: 80) : 'The free basic water policy is simply one part of the tariff policy.' In this regard, setting a limited volume of water at zero charge at the first block was intentionally determined to respond consistently with the international tariff expertise at the time. That is, although South Africa appeared to swim against the prevailing economic orthodoxy, its technical conceptualisation was entirely consistent with contemporary ideological tariff design thinking. It appears that the selection of a low volume of water at the first block, not related to the perceived appropriate water requirements of the user but to the economic and later demand management imperatives of the state (see Muller, 2008) , was intentional.
The adoption of the Dublin principles in 1992 at the International Conference on Water and the Environment meant that water would be treated as an 'economic good' (Rogers et al., 2002; Savenije & van der Zaag, 2002) . A few months later the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Earth Summit) in Rio de Janeiro pronounced water a 'social good' -the initial economic principles prevailed. In line with this discourse, the full cost pricing of water services became important. International scholars have argued that the final price to consumers should then include not just the operation, maintenance and capital costs but also the opportunity costs, economic and environmental externality costs (Rogers et al., 1998) . Such pricing (in this view) implied that not only would the resource then be put to its most valuable uses, send the 'correct' messages to users that 'water is an economic good in scarce supply … and must be treated as a valuable commodity' (Whittington, 2003: 61, 70) but also ensure equity, fairness, efficiency, sufficiency of revenue and environmental sustainability (Boland & Whittington, 1998; Rogers et al., 2002) .
Tariff structures entail a mix of competing objectives, which are typically articulated as the following: revenue sufficiency, economic efficiency, equity and fairness, income redistribution and resource conservation; secondary considerations include public acceptability, political acceptability, simplicity and transparency, net revenue stability and ease of implementation (Boland & Whittington, 1998: 4-5; Rogers et al., 2002) . Additional mechanisms to achieve such objectives are broadly housed within the 'demand management' rubric, which includes, among others, metered water usage, education and training, user charges, subsidies and penalties (Savenije & van der Zaag, 2002) . However, there is contestation within the dominant school of 'economic' thought as to the best tariff design to achieve the above objectives. Historically, utilities employed 'uniform' charges, but there has been a substantial move towards IBT (Savenije & van der Zaag, 2002 ) and more recently a combination of IBT with a fixed charge has been mooted (Boland & Whittington, 1998; Rogers et al., 2002; Whittington, 2003) .
The use of IBTs has been acclaimed as an instrument for improving access and ensuring equity (Rogers et al., 2002: 7; Savenije & van der Zaag, 2002; UNDP: Human Development Report, 2006) . IBTs provide a lifeline or minimum supply to poor users below cost, which is subsidised by users who consume beyond the minimum supply and are charged at higher rates (Rogers et al., 2002) . This has resulted, according to Boland & Whittington (1998: 1) , in a situation in which, 'IBT have become the tariff structure of choice in developing countries'.
The debate about the use of IBTs is primarily located on the determination of the size of the first block parameter and price. In this regard, critics argue that the first block is generally too big and underpriced (Boland & Whittington, 1998) . This, they argue, sends the wrong message to consumers and can undermine financial revenue and the sustainability of the service (Whittington, 2003) . This situation, they suggest, is caused by undue political interference in the tariff design process by actors who do not appreciate the complexity of balancing the competing objectives and indeed that tariff setting should be done with a long-term view (Boland & Whittington, 1998; Whittington, 2003) . According to Boland & Whittington (1998: 6) an 'ideal' IBT should ensure that 'relatively few users terminate their consumption in this (first) block'. That is, the first block parameter should be 'not more than 5 kl per month', which would ensure that only those for whom the subsidy is targeted consume within this block and all others fall into the second tariff block, thereby permitting the utility to recover the marginal cost of supply (Boland & Whittington, 1998: 7) . The suggestion of an additional fixed charge is as an attempt to remedy the situation where the above 'ideal' is not politically possible and thereby is an effort to secure and stabilise revenue sufficiency as well as to prevent zero or negative bills (Boland & Whittington, 1998; Rogers et al., 2002) .
South African policy directives reflect this prevailing international orthodoxy. South African tariff regulations require that municipal tariff structures are designed on an IBT, with three or more tariff blocks, and further allow for a fixed charge for households exceeding the 6 kl free basic supply (DWAF, 2002c) . Regulations reflect 'the more you use, the more you pay' principle (DWAF, 2002c: 72) , with the first tariff block comprising a maximum of 6 kl 'set at the lowest amount, including a zero amount' (DWAF, 2002c: 72) . In this regard, it is useful to return to Boland & Whittington's (1998) critique of IBTs as including too large a volume in the first block and bemoaning political interference. The introduction of free basic water within the prevailing IBT framework may have actually met all the 'requirements' of Boland & Whittington's (1998) 'ideal' design -the first block appears small enough to ensure that termination (for the majority) is achieved in the second marginal cost block.
In this regard, South Africa's free basic water policy, despite the naysayers, appears consistent with full cost pricing philosophies. Ironically, it is the political 'interference' that may have delivered the 'best practice' principles which have regulated the size of the first block tariff; thereby allowing this full cost pricing to take shape. As former Minister Kasrils (quoted in DWAF, 2003: 27) stated, 'In South Africa, we treat water as both a social and an economic good. Once social needs have been met, we manage water as an economic good, as is appropriate for a scarce resource. ' The volume of water offered via the free basic water policy apparently meets Kasrils's 'social good' requirements. The National Water Services Regulation Strategy explicitly stipulates affordability criteria for a 'basic' supply and not supply per se (DWAF, 2008: 57) . Tariff structures, after the first 6 kl block, must be 'cost-reflexive' and therefore may increase sharply (RSA, 1997: 18; DWAF, 2003: 27) . Indeed, this might in part explain why South Africa's free basic water policy, initially having been severely criticised by international agencies is now being promoted as a strategy to meet the Millennium Development Goals, following the South African example by ensuring free or lifeline tariffs to the world's poor (UNDP: Human Development Report, 2006: 22, 66 ).
In such a dominant milieu, local scholars have contested the apparent equity of IBT, which appear to be far more concerned with cost recovery. Core to such critiques is that the first block or 'lifeline' is too narrow to absorb the consumption needs of poor households, with subsequent blocks relatively very expensive for poor householders (not increasing sufficiently gradually in price to promote affordability) (McDonald, 2002d; Bond, 2004; Smith & Green, 2005) . This meant that poor households that fall into steep subsequent blocks, out of necessity (they required more than 6 kl) not over-consumption, accrue very little or no financial relief (McDonald, 2002b; Ruiters, 2005; Bond, 2007 ; and see Smith, 2009 ).
Further to this, the cross-subsidisation of domestic normal consumption levels (after the first free block) for poor households is severely constrained by the reluctance of local governments (and the national regulatory framework) to institute punitive tariffs for higher than normal domestic consumption for upper income or overconsuming groupings (Harvey, 2003; Loftus, 2005; Bond & Dugard, 2008; Centre for Applied Legal Studies, 2008; Dugard, 2009; Smith, 2009 ). For example, Dugard (2009: 14) states:
… while households in rich suburbs continued to be able to access as much water as they liked -for their gardens, swimming pools, fish ponds, baths, etc. -without any direct pressure to conserve, in 2002 the City (Johannesburg) devised a plan to physically restrict water consumption in poor households to the obligatory FBW allocation, unless the household could purchase additional water in the form of water credit vouchers.
Moreover, Laila Smith (2006: 29) cites the Chief Executive Officer of Johannesburg Water Management, Jean Pierre Mas, saying:
… it would be foolish to reduce the income stream of the company by trying to promote water conservation from households that actually pay their bills, as this is where, at present, the bulk of the company's water revenues come from.
This raises questions regarding the real purposes of free basic water, as it appears to be a strategy to contain poor, historically discriminated and underserved households to low volumes of water which the state can afford to offer, given its financial and resource priorities. For example, Muller (2008: 67) in his summation of free basic water stated that '… (free basic water) has supported the broader objectives of conservation and environmental sustainability. The political legitimacy conferred by the approach has enabled water supply organizations to recover costs and achieve the economic objective of financial sustainability.' Considering the magnitude of the challenge to bring millions of poor households onto the water grid, it appears that free basic water was a smart strategy to ensure delivery that overcame past water supply programme flaws of water security and affordability. However, it went much further than this. Offering minimum volumes of water at zero charge further provided the space to achieve financial and resource sustainability because the poor would be contained to only the volume offered unless they could pay for more (Harvey, 2003; Loftus, 2005; Bond & Dugard, 2008; Centre for Applied Legal Studies, 2008; Dugard, 2009; Smith, 2009) . The blunt end of this reality however, which must be acknowledged, is that the free basic water objectives of improving public health, reducing the gender burden and promoting equity cannot be substantially addressed unless and until the free volumes offered are increased to meet the dignity and productive requirements of poor households (thereby acting transformatively) or if tariffs above the limited offering are affordable for poor households.
Conclusion
Free basic water was introduced as an instrument to alleviate poverty, promote equity, free women and children from the drudgery of water collection, ease the affordability crisis and promote better hygiene. In the context of a post-apartheid state, which had shown the capacity for miracles, a social policy, which would ensure that every household had access to basic municipal services, was not peculiar. High levels of public trust, coupled with the axiom that poverty alleviation initiatives are typically welcomed unopposed (Ferguson, 1994) , meant that academics, activists and the left alike, deluded by the smart magic of free basic water's architects, failed to subject the policy to sufficient scrutiny.
The careful selection of low water volumes and the amendment of tariff designs to ensure that consumers terminated their consumption in the second block all served to reinforce orthodox economic practice. The coup of technical expertise from a particular ideological perspective further served to ensure that households unable to pay for volumes beyond 6 kl would be legitimately prevented from using more than the government concession. The literature of international anti-development scholars in particular resonated with the manner in which 'need' was constructed and then 'remedied', divorced from problematisation and input from poor citizens themselves. Poor households, the target of the policy, where not homogenous, they had different water needs, different incomes, different service levels; they lived in different places, their household characteristics were different and their values accorded to water were disparate. The final volumes offered were proscribed by experts and reflected expert notions of physiology and cost, not the values, needs and lived experience of poor households.
In this regard, the prime mover, which facilitated the structuring of free basic water into a containment strategy at the level of the poor, is located within the myopic 'Durban case'. Affidavits suggest that the 'research' which informed the free basic water policy linked a linear ideology of economically constructed scarcity, technocratic calculation, patronising 'help', cost containment, bureaucratic administration and haste. This local initiative, which focussed on improving access to marginal households which previously had non-permanent access and inadequate volumes, should not have been expanded nationally to households which had historical full-pressure and permanent access. This policy, which would affect millions of households at the most infinitesimal level, required more rigorous handling. This is because a policy of limitation may act retrogressively on previous secure access and therefore maintaining the offering at 6 kl within a commodification framework, which restricted and excluded poor households from accessing enough (socially defined) water, would have serious domestic, health, gender and psycho-social implications. The Durban case simply could not be made universal enough to achieve original social objectives without modification, rigorous exploration and dialogue. Instead, it appears that social objectives were jettisoned for the opportunities that an unmodified free water design presented local municipalities. The offering of free water enabled the local state legitimacy to restrict the water consumption of poor households unable to pay for the volumes required. It therefore operated to contain costs, to maintain the cost recovery project (only those able to pay more could access more), to subjugate, segment and separate citizens (through, for example, indigent policies), all under the guise of symbolic but not substantial basic human development goals.
